Scher to FDA about Provenge hearing
This is the text of Howard Scher M.D.’s letter to FDA about the March 29th advisory committee hearing on Dendreon’s vaccine Sipuleucel-T (Provenge):
I am writing to express concerns about the recent review of Sipuleucel-T at the FDA Advisory Meeting on March 29, 2007. These concerns are: a recommendation for approval based on data that fall short of the regulatory requirements; an inadequate statistical construct to determine definitive benefit; incomplete data on product safety; and what appear to be different criteria for approval by two Advisory Committees to the Agency. All but the latter were discussed in the open meeting, but warrant further consideration given the outcome. The concerns are based on my experience as a voting member on several ODACs representing the Agency, and separately, as a Presenter to ODAC for Industry Sponsors. I have been one of the Academic Leaders of the Prostate Cancer Clinical Trial Endpoints initiative begun under the joint Sponsorship of the FDA, AACR, ASCO and PCF in 2004, which were presented at the February 2007, Prostate ASCO Meeting in Orlando. The final manuscript is currently under review at the NCI, FDA and the Group of established Prostate Cancer Clinical Trial experts who together, formulated the recommendations. I am also the Principal Investigator of a Multicenter Prostate Cancer Clinical Trials Consortium funded by the Department of Defense that focuses on phase 1 and 2 trials in this disease.
Let me state at the outset that I was one of the four Committee Members who voted “no” to the question whether the trials presented by the Sponsor established the efficacy or demonstrated substantial evidence of benefit to justify an approval recommendation to the FDA. My vote was based on the fact that neither of the two trials presented met their primary endpoint, which renders the significance of results from any subsequent analyses as “exploratory” and “hypothesis generating.” As such, the results do not constitute “proof” of benefit or justify a conclusion that they are “reasonably likely” to predict benefit. The trial data were not consistent. Even if one accepts the posthoc survival analysis results of the larger 127 patient trial (82 men treated with Sipuleucel-T and 45 men treated with a “placebo”), the second trial of 98 patients (65 treated with Sipuleucel-T and 33 with placebo) was not confirmatory. Consequently, the only conclusion that can be reached is that the survival difference observed may have occurred by chance alone, and that the results do not support an approval recommendation. This, and the Sponsor’s recognition that an additional prospective study was needed, mandates deferring any decision on whether an approval should be granted until the results of the ongoing 500 patient phase 3 trial that is powered on a primary endpoint of survival, is accrued and analyzed.
Concerns about the validity of the findings were reinforced by the absence of other signals of an antitumor effect. Specifically there were no data provided of a favorable effect on PSA, regression or stabilization of soft-tissue or boney disease radiographically, health related quality of life, or that administration of the product delayed the development of pain. Even the time to the administration of chemotherapy, an indication to the treating Physicians that the clinical course had worsened, was similar between the two groups. Reinforcing the uncertainty was the fact that in response to a direct question at the meeting, none of the Physicians representing the Sponsor could articulate how treatment with the product had “helped” any individual patient.
There were also methodologic concerns. Trial 9901 was designed to show an increase in time to disease progression from 16 weeks for placebo treated to 31 weeks for Sipleucel-T treated patients (HR = 1.92, alpha =0.05, two sided, with 80% power). A total of 127 patients were enrolled using a 2:1 randomization in favor of the experimental therapy. The study was double blind and included an independent review of all imaging results. The estimated time to progression on which the trial was powered proved to an overestimate, as the actual observed median time to progression was 9 to 11 weeks for both arms: a difference that was not statistically significant. A summary of the progression events showed that 90% (97/114) were by imaging, 10 were clinical, and 7 were for the new onset of disease related pain. Unrecognized at the time of the design of the trial, was that the eight week interval between disease assessments was too short to observe clinically significant changes by bone scan, and that in many cases, apparent “progressions” eight weeks after the start of a therapy are more a reflection of disease worsening that led to trial entry, and not a failure of the treatment.(CCR 13:1488, 2007) This is similar to what was observed in the trial with the endothelin antagonist, atrasentan, in which a 12 week disease assessment interval was used and a large proportion of patients were withdrawn at the time of scheduled scans in the absence of clinical worsening of disease (ODAC, September 13, 2005). Recognizing this, the Prostate Cancer Working Group 2 was advised that an apparent progression on bone scan at a three month assessment, be confirmed by documenting further progression on a subsequent scan six or more weeks later before considering a patient to have failed the treatment.(ASCO Multidisciplinary Prostate Cancer Symposium, (Abstract #221) February 22-24, 2007, Orlando, FL, 2007). Although the Sponsor suggested that the effect of the product was delayed, this hypothesis could not be explored because serial imaging to assess disease at defined intervals were not performed once a patient was considered to have “progressed” and taken off study. As a result, individual sites of disease were no longer being monitored, so that no statements could be made regarding a possible “delayed effect” of the product on disease status.
At 3-years, a prespecified survival analysis was performed which showed a 4.5 month difference in median survival favoring Sipuleucel-T, and while a significant p-value for the difference was determined, the type 1 error rate is surely inflated by this additional analysis. Imbalances in disease aggressiveness and disease extent were noted between the Sipuleucel-T and “control” groups including a higher proportion with Gleason 6 disease or less at diagnosis (26.8% vs. 15.6%), and a lower proportion with both bone and soft tissue disease (52% vs. 69%) at the time therapy was started. Both factors favored the Sipuleucel-T arm, predicting a longer survival for the “treated” patients independent of therapy. The 2:1 randomization increased the power of the experimental arm, but it may have inadvertently made the small 43 patient control group more heterogeneous and less representative of the global population of men for whom the indication was proposed. The potential impact of heterogeneity in small patient cohorts was shown when a post-study change in the progression times of two patients (a change not accepted by the Agency), resulted in a change in the significance estimates.
The first question the Agency posed to the Committee was whether the product was “reasonably safe” for the intended population. While the vote was yes, the issue of cerebrovascular events as a potential safety signal was raised. This concern was based on the finding that 4.9% (17/345) of the Sipuleucel-T and 1.7% (3/172) of “placebo” treated patients who were enrolled on randomized trials for the indication, experienced a cerebrovascular event (p=0.092). The odds ratio for developing a cerebrovascular event was 2.92, with wide confidence intervals (0.82 to as high as 10 fold). Deaths due to CVA’s were recorded in 1.5% of Sipuleucel-T patients and 0.9% of those receiving “placebo.” Unclear is why there is no mention of CVA’s in the published report of the study in the Journal of Clinical Oncology (JCO 24:3089, 2006). Given that the product is released for administration based on the increase in the proportion of CD54+ cells and not the absolute number of any particular cell type and that CD54+ cells actually represent only 20% of the final product, the contribution of the other cell populations and cytokines that may be present in the administered product on the development of a cerebrovascular event is not known. More important, and perhaps underappreciated during the discussion, is the recognition that the “placebo” used in this trial, a portion of the leukopheresis product that is cultured without the immunizing antigen and reinfused, may not be inert and in itself contributed to a relative worsening of survival for the control group in this trial. To place the frequency of the neurologic events in perspective, no cerebrovascular events were observed in TAX-327, a 997 patient three arm randomized trial that evaluated two different dose schedules of docetaxel in comparison to mitoxantrone,(NEJM 351:1052, 2004) or ASCENT1, a 251 patient randomized comparison of docetaxel weekly with or without high dose calcitriol (DN-101)(JCO 25:669, 2007). Neurologic events that were not detailed further were observed in 7% of the 338 patients who received estramustine which is known to be thrombogenic, in combination with docetaxel on the SWOG 99-16 trial (NEJM 351:1513, 2004).
Another concern is that the requirements for regulatory approval appear to differ between the ODAC and CBER Advisory Committee. As an example, ASCENT1 was a prospective randomized phase 2 trial of weekly docetaxel with or without high dose calcitriol (DN-101). The trial was powered to detect a 20% difference in the PSA response rate at six months between the two groups as the primary endpoint, but also included a pre-specified survival analysis, similar to that included in the Sipuleucel-T 9901 trial as one of the secondary endpoints. PSA response was defined as a 50% or greater decline from baseline according to Consensus Criteria (JCO 17:3461, 1999). A total of 250 patients, 125 per arm were enrolled and followed. The 9% difference in the PSA response rate observed at six months was not statistically significant (P
An approval recommendation has far reaching implications beyond making the product available that the data simply do not support or justify. For one, it provides the Agency’s endorsement of Sipuleucel-T as a “standard of care” treatment for an asymptomatic population of men with androgen independent (castration resistant) disease that represents upwards of 45,000 men in the U.S. The second is that by extension, it elevates Sipuleucel-T to a position of being the new “control” arm for future randomized phase 3 trials that are being designed for the regulatory approval of any new experimental agent or approach. It also opens the door to the premature approval of drugs based on inconclusive data. Finally, the original question posed by the Agency to the Advisory Committee at the meeting was: “Does the submitted data establish the efficacy of Sipuleucel-T (APC-8015) in the intended population?” The first 4 respondees on the Committee voted “no.” The question was then changed to: Do the data show “substantial evidence.” A series of “yes” votes followed.
Consider the conclusion in the manuscript describing the results of trial 9901, published in the
Journal of Clinical Oncology in Volume 24, page 3093, in 2006.(JCO 24:3089, 2006) In it, the Investigators state “that while sipuleucel-T fell short of demonstrating a statistically significant difference in TTP, it MAY provide a survival advantage to asymptomatic HRPC patients. Supportive studies are underway to confirm this effect.” All of the difficulties cited, and the Investigator’s own conclusions, show how there are simply too many alternative explanations for the observed survival difference beyond treatment with Sipuleucel-T. Couple this with that fact that were no secondary signals of an antitumor effect and no confirmatory trial however flawed, mandates that any decision for approval be deferred until the phase 3 study, currently underway, has been completed and analyzed.
The above letter is reprinted from The Cancer Letter, Vol. 33 No. 14 April 13, 2007.
Glad to see the Administrator question whether or not Scher disclosed all his Conflicts of Interest and provided those he actually disclosed to the FDA in order to receive a waiver to sit on the Provenge Advisory Committee.
Publicly available internet information shows these apparent Scher COIs (so far): [Particular attention is directed to items 1, 2 and—especially–15, but ALL—in totality– are important and telling, imo]
1. Novcea: STUDY CHAIR of DN-101; Grants & Research support - Direct competitor to Provenge
2. Medivation, Inc: PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR MDV3100;
3. Innovive Pharmaceuticals: PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR
4. Infinity Pharmaceuticals: PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR
5. Cougar Biotechnology: PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR; Advisory Board
6. Department of Defense: PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR PC Clinical Trials-P1 and P2
7. Bristol Myers Squibb: Consultant, Grants & Research support
8. Millennium Pharmaceuticals: Grant of Research support
9. sanofi-aventis: Grants & Research support
10. Genta: Scientific Advisory Board (as of March 6, 2007; since removed from web, but cached)
11. Biogen-Idec: Joint stock with spouse
12. Pfizer: Joint stock with spouse
13. Pharmion: Financial Conflict of Interest per Scher quote in MedPage
14. GPB Biotech: Financial Conflict of Interest per Scher quote in MedPage
15. PROQUEST INVESTMENTS: Consultant, Scientific Advisory Board; Limited Partner FINANCIAL interest
Go back and read #15 again…. He’s reported to be a “LIMITED PARTNER” in a Proquest partnership; doesn’t that suggest FINANCIAL investment?????
Here are three of the 1,000 or so patients treated with Provenge:
Edwardo Garcia of California who appeared at the FDA AC meeting speaking in favor of Provenge… alive after 7 years post-treatment
Kenneth Agnor of Chesapeake, VA. Read his story here:
http://content.hamptonroads.com/story.cfm?story=125573&ran=108297
Note his doctor, Paul Schellhammer, a Norfolk urologist, has treated 30+ patients and is active in the current, on-going D9902b Provenge trial.
… and Bruce Tower’s story about his success with Provenge here:
http://www.cedarcreekpilot.com/local/local_story_221172118.html
Unfortunately, imo, this controversy is taking away from the ultimate goal: assisting prostate cancer patients access to life-extending treatments which give the added benefit of a solid Quality of Life.
Those able are invited to attend a rally for Prostate Cancer patients at the FDA in Washington, DC on Sept 18th at 10 am.
Good Luck to all cancer victims!
Comment by Tony F — August 10, 2007 @ 12:58 pmThank you Admin for standing up for decency!
While I delivered a statement in favor of Provenge at the hearing and marched in this week’s Raise a Voice rally in Washington, I’m sure I am typical of the vast majority of the prostate cancer survivor community in recoiling from the threats made against Drs. Scher and Hussain. I am also disturbed by unsupported allegations against the integrity of these doctors. A smear campaign should be no part of our advocacy effort. While I disagree with the stands taken by these two highly respected physicians and researchers, I fully respect their right to express their views and find nothing wrong with their writing post-hearing letters to the FDA and communicating them to the Cancer Letter, if they were the ones to do that. This is America, and we have a constitutional right to free speech. Moreover, the FDA is not a rubber stamp for its advisory committees and has a right and duty to make judgements on drug approvals.
Dr. Scher made several points, and I have a reasoned disagreement with some of those. However, here is an excerpt that also bothers me, as it did Dr. Scher: “Imbalances in disease aggressiveness and disease extent were noted between the Sipuleucel-T and “control” groups including a higher proportion with Gleason 6 disease or less at diagnosis (26.8% vs. 15.6%), and a lower proportion with both bone and soft tissue disease (52% vs. 69%) at the time therapy was started. Both factors favored the Sipuleucel-T arm, predicting a longer survival for the “treated” patients independent of therapy. The 2:1 randomization increased the power of the experimental arm, but it may have inadvertently made the small 43 patient control group more heterogeneous and less representative of the global population of men for whom the indication was proposed. The potential impact of heterogeneity in small patient cohorts was shown when a post-study change in the progression times of two patients (a change not accepted by the Agency), resulted in a change in the significance estimates.”
In essence, imbalances in the arms of the trial could be behind the apparent benefit in a small trial with a very small control group of 43 patients, some of whose members elected to receive salvage Provenge and/or docetaxel. Drs. Hussain also addressed this point. I have raised a fresh point regarding possible imbalance in my reply yesterday under Dr. Hussain’s letter.
From my School of Hard Knocks perspective as an eighth year survivor of a challenging case of prostate cancer, I would like to see some kind of interim approval that would allow access while not treating Provenge as a standard of care or benchmark, pending conclusive results of the larger trial, hopefully at the time the interim analysis is made in about a year. But I appreciate the reasoned, fact-based, experience and expertise-based positions of both Drs. Scher and Hussain. I thank them for their service on FDA panels and hope they will be willing to continue that service.
Comment by Jim Waldenfels — June 6, 2007 @ 9:04 amIn response to HH (below), who writes:
The news titled “Novacea and Schering-Plough Enter Into Worldwide Development and Commercialization Agreement for Asentar, a Novel Treatment for Prostate Cancer” was just published at your web site. Howard Scher is the lead investigator of Asentar. Scher claimed that he had no Conflict of Interests after he sent this letter to the FDA. Well, we know he lied now.
Do we know this? HH, it seems to me that you (and many on investors’ message boards) misinterpret the FDA’s waiver system, or else distort it. Conflict of interest is a serious problem if it is hidden or concealed. (All too often it is concealed from patients participating in clinical trials, by failure to inform these patients that some of the clinical investigators stand to gain financially. See e.g. in last week’s New York Times, …. a Downside to Full Disclosure. One of the worst cases of this in recent US history was exposed by the Seattle Times in their series March 11-15, 2001 Uninformed Consent).
Let’s get one thing clear. Dr. Scher did not claim that he had no conflicts of interest, neither before nor “after he sent his letter.” On the contrary, before he participated on the Advisory Committee, he DECLARED 3 potential conflicts of interest, and received a waiver for them from the FDA. His declaration is in the public record and on the FDA website. Regrettably, the FDA blacks out words that identify the specifics, but this applies to all the waivers. Several members of the committee that was convened March 29-30 received conflict of interest waivers: Glenn Dranoff, M.D.; Mary M. Horowitz, M.D.; Maha Hussian, M.D., FACP; Mary J. Laughlin, M.; James J. Mule, Ph.D.; Derek Raghavan, M.D., Ph.D. (Dr. Raghavan was unable to attend this meeting); Howard I. Scher, M.D.; Savio L. C. Woo, Ph.D.
OK. So, Dr. Scher is lead investigator in Novacea’s Asentar Phase III clinical trial. The public has known this for more than a year, at least since April 2006. Did Scher conceal it from the FDA Advisory Committee? Not likely. Here’s what he declared (regrettably, FDA hides specific identities of competing firms):
That’s his summary declaration. And here’s the FDA’s understanding (page 2) of what Scher declared:
What are the competing firms? Novacea’s Asentar is an investigational drug and could be the one “that is also being studied in several types of cancer” for which Scher’s institution receives the second mentioned grant (Novacea says “we are developing Asentar as a novel, oral anti-cancer agent which we expect will have applicability to multiple tumor types … including prostate, breast and colon”). If so, Dr. Scher did not lie about this at all. He told the FDA the facts, they considered the matter, and for reasons they state they issued a waiver.
In any case, how much of a conflict actually exists between Provenge and Asentar? I for one don’t believe Provenge is being suppressed by a conspiracy by the chemotherapy cartel. Dr. Petrylak’s re-analysis of Dendreon’s data indicates that Provenge has more impact on survival when used with Taxotere than when used alone. Asentar (a patented concentrated form of a high-dose vitamin D3) is being tested with Taxotere versus Taxotere alone. If both Provenge and Asentar are approved, Some AIPC patients probably will use both.
So far I haven’t seen anything that convinces me that Scher’s, Hussain’s and Fleming’s letters to the FDA were motivated by financial interests.
Nonetheless, more needs to be brought out about a range of conflicts of interest that come into play during clinical trials and during the rest of the approval process. And more needs to be done to speed up delivery of safe and effective drugs to cancer patients in the clinic. Thank for your interest and your input. Please believe that I care about men with AIPC.
Comment by admin — May 31, 2007 @ 3:51 amThe news titled “Novacea and Schering-Plough Enter Into Worldwide Development and Commercialization Agreement for Asentar, a Novel Treatment for Prostate Cancer” was just published at your web site. Howard Scher is the lead investigator of Asentar. Scher claimed that he had no Conflict of Interests after he sent this letter to the FDA. Well, we know he lied now.
Comment by HH — May 30, 2007 @ 7:40 pmI think you must feel quite happy that FDA issued an approvable letter for Provenge BLA today. Your web site has clearly played a role in helping to block this effective and safe treatment by publishing letters like this. I’m wondering whether your web site is trying to help Prostate Cancer paitent or you have other unknown purposes.
Comment by HH — May 9, 2007 @ 7:16 pmI am writing to ask if this drug has ever been tested in conjunction with standard prostate cancer treatments such as the radiated seeds that my two elderly male friends have used. As it been considered as a secondary line of attack or defense in any controlled study?
I am curious as to whether or not this drug has been researched in conjunction with standard slash, poison, burn cancer treatments or the more advanced radiated seed therapies that my 2 friends, both elderly men, are currently receiving. Due to the fact that the drug in question (Provenge) very simply put “excites” the body’s own immune system as a line of defense against the cancer cells, it is really no wonder that the drug does not arrest the growth of cancer. If the body’s immune system were capable of eradicating the cancer cells, no treatment would be necessary. I would like to know exactly what positive things for the immune system the drug shows. Information is sketchy.
My questions are two-fold in subject matter: FIRST… has any research been done in control groups to test the validity of using this drug in combination with the standard prostate cancer treatments in use today? I am just a lay person in this area, but wondered if this drug might not be the extra ‘push’ that would help standard treatment be:
1. more effective in arresting cancer cell growth
2. of assistance in helping the body recover from the harmful side effects that current
standard treatments can cause
SECOND… are more studies planned regarding the possiblity of drug related CVA’s? Was the CVA connection definite?
Thank anyone who can help me to better understand.
Emma
Comment by emmalou — April 18, 2007 @ 6:43 am